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Summary
Rising crime rates within traditional sanctioning patterns have
resulted in a search for alternatives to incarceration in order to
control both the economic and social (humanitarian) costs of punishment.
The paper explores this response in four countries: England, Germany,
Sweden, and the United States—all modern, industrial democracies. The
paper focuses upon the response in terms of the role accorded monetary
penalties as an alternative to incarceration. This role is analyzed in
terms of the evolution of penal policy, operational experiences with
fines—effectiveness and enforcement—and in the actual use of fines
relative to incarceration, as a sentencing disposition for traditional
crimes in each country. The major finding is that among the four countries
the United States accords fines a very minor role. The reasons for this
difference are explored and it is concluded that the use of fines in the
United States—when compared to European experiencewhen compared to
European experienceappears to be far below the ttlevel that would
minimize the economic and social cost of punishment.
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Fines as an Alternative Criminal Sanction to Incarceration:
An International Perspective
I. Introduction :
One of the shared experiences of modern democracies has been the
rapid rise of crime. While crime itself, of course, is one of the
oldest problems that any social order has to deal with, the rapid rate
of increase in crime rates since 1950 has placed unusual strains on
the traditional institutions and methods of social control of crime.
The problem can be described in human terms—number of persons vic-
timized or rising prison populations, or in economic terms—rising
expenditures of the institutions of the criminal justice system.
The institution with the least slack to absorb the rapid rise in
crime has generally been the prison system. Not only is the capacity
of the prison system rather rigid in the short to medium run, but this
form of punishment has highest economic and social costs of any sanc-
tion. Consequently, one general response of all governments to this
problem has been to seek reliance, at the margin, upon alternatives to
incarceration and to seek new alternatives by innovation. The motiva-
tion to find alternatives comes not only from economic pressures, but
also from a body of public and professional opinion which views incar-
ceration as positively harmful. Those sharing this view have opposed
rising new prison construction on humanitarian grounds. In the United
States the pressures of rising crime rates on the criminal justice
system, particularly the prisons, have been exacerbated by an effort
Co contain the rising crime through longer effective prison sentences.
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The purpose of this paper is to explore a particular alternative
sanction to incarceration, one that historically antedates incarcera-
tion, the fine. Although all countries utilize the fine to some extent
as a criminal sanction, it has received far more recent emphasis in
European countries both in connection with penal reform as well as a
response to rising crime and prison populations than in the United
States. It should be emphasized that we are concerned with the use of
fines as a sanction only for offenses where incarceration is viewed as
an appropriate alternative sanction. The discussion is not concerned
with the use of fines for minor regulatory offenses, e.g., most
motoring offenses, game law violations, etc.
In our review of the experiences of specific countries, we will
explore the use of fines from three perspectives: first, we will exa-
mine the recent history of the evolution of the role of fines in penal
theory and policy. Second, we shall review research on the relative
effectiveness of fines and on enforcement of fines; finally, we shall
examine sentencing patterns for traditional crimes where both fines and
incarceration are sentencing options. A principal objective of the
analysis of sentencing patterns will be to determine as accurately as
possible the extent to which fines are in fact used as a substitute for
incarceration in each country.
The use of fines as a sanction is not only of interest from the
point of view of comparative social policy, but it has particular
relevance from the point of view of the economics of punishment. As
the costs of the criminal justice system rise, questions of economic
efficiency become increasingly relevant. It is the main conclusion of
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this paper that the use of fines in the U.S.—when contrasted with
European practice—appears to be far below the level that would mini-
mize the social costs of punishment without sacrificing the other
objectives of punishment. This conclusion is arrived at after exa-
mining the use of fines in three European countries which are
generally similar to the U.S. in terms of political and economic
structure, i.e., developed industrial democracies. We then review the
attitudes and institutional constraints which appear to be responsible
for the far less extensive use of fines in the U.S.
II. The English Experience
Policy History : From the mid 1960 's one of the major preoccupations
of policy has been efforts to reduce the prison population and the use
of imprisonment [Home Office, 1976: 5]. These goals have manifested
themselves in legislation through the work of the Advisory Council on
the Penal System and in the research efforts of the Home Office
Research Unit. In each case the use of fines has been seen as one
method of attaining the goal.
The legislative basis for the use of fines was strengthened by the
Criminal Justice Act of 1967 . The act increased the maximum fines
which magistrates courts could impose from fclOO to 1:400. To increase
the effectiveness of collection, offenders were given longer time to
pay and they could not be committed to prison in default of payment
unless a court inquiry into the offenders financial means had been held
and had reached the conclusion that no other means of enforcement was
possible. The courts were also given the power to remit fines and to
use attachment of earnings as a means of enforcement [Home Office,
1970: 5].
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As a further response to the rising prison population, the Home
Secretary asked the Advisory Council on the Penal System to review
and to consider changes in the range of non-custodial penalties
[Home Office, 1970: 1]. This inquiry produced the Council report,
Non-Custodial and Semi-Custodial Penalties .
The Council's discussion of the use of fines was centered upon two
issues. First, the principles governing how the level of a fine should
be established for a given offender and a given offense. In dealing
with this question they were much influenced by the Swedish Day-fine
system. Under this system the gravity of the offense determines the
number of day fines, then the offender's financial means is used to
determine the monetary value of each day fine. It was their view that
"The fine will be equitable only if it is assessed in this way and con-
stitutes something more than payment for a license to commit the par-
ticular offense [Home Office, 1970: 7]. While they were much impressed
by the day fine system, they could not recommend its immediate adoption.
Practical problems of providing the court sufficient information on
the offender's financial situation appeared to be the major obstacle.
The second major issue dealt with enforcement or problems of
collection. They approached this issue from the premise that a fine
should be truly a non-custodial penalty, that is "...that offenders
upon whom a fine has been imposed should not be committed to prison if
they have failed to pay that fine solely for want of the means to do
so [Home Office, 1970: 9]. To further reduce the small percentage of
defaulters (about 0.6% in 1969) committed to prison for default, they
recommended that a proposed special Enforcement Office for civil debts
also be given the responsibility for collecting overdue fines and the
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power Co attach the offenders property or earnings. Such an Office
would also be charged with maintaining a register of defaulters which
could be consulted by the courts to inform their sentencing decision
in the event of recidivism. As to the question of whether prison
should ever ultimately be used in the event of default, the Council
was divided in their opinion. A minority favored imprisonment only if
it were established by a new criminal proceeding that the failure to
pay was willful. The majority rejected this on the grounds that it
could seriously burden the court system and that the immediate threat
of prison was the only effective sanction to motivate payment by a
small but significant group of offenders.
In brief, the increasing use of fines in England and Wales has been
motivated primarily by a desire to control the rising economic costs of
punishment and has been accomplished substantially within the
existing institutional framework. That is, there have been only modest
innovations in the legal and correctional structures to make them more
conducive to monetary penalties.
Operational Aspects : The English experience stands alone among the
countries under review in terms of the number of research studies
which have addressed the use of fines as a penal sanction. This
research has been both evaluative and descriptive. The evaluative
research has as its objective the measurement of the relative effec-
tiveness of alternative punishments or treatments; the criterion for
judging effectiveness is usually reconviction rates over some follow
up period. The descriptive research has focused on sentencing prac-
tices of the courts, e.g., to what extent have fines been used, and
enforcement practices and their results.
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The earliest study deals with the effectiveness of alternative
sanctions. The research was primarily based upon all offenders con-
victed in the Metropolitan Police District (London) during a two month
period in 1957. Using a five year follow up for reconviction rates
and controlling for age and prior convictions the study found that
"Fines, particularly the heavier ones, appear to be among the most
'successful' penalties for almost all types of offenders [Home Office,
1969: 73]. Because of the relative paucity of research on the effi-
cacy of fines, this study's conclusion is widely cited. The method-
ology, however, has also drawn both criticism and support [Bottoms,
1973; Bradbury, 1969].
The primary criticism is that so few variables were controlled for
when contrasting the effectiveness of fines to other sanctions. It is
possible that this effectiveness is based upon variables which were not
controlled for but which some astute judges recognized and used in their
sentencing decisions. Until one can be more sure that such important
omitted variables do not exist, any generalization of the studies result
regarding fines to other samples and judges should be considered very
tentative.
A more recent study is based upon a sample of over 3,000 offenders
summarily convicted of property offenses or offenses against the person
during one week in Magistrates Courts in 1974 [Softley, 1978]. This is
of particular interest because the reconviction rates within two years
of those fined were compared to similar reconviction rates for several
other sanctions imposed on those in the samples. Among the sanctions of:
absolute conditional discharge, probation, suspended sentence, incar-
ceration, or 'other, ' fines had the lowest two year reconviction rate.
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When the same reconviction rates were compared controlling for age and
previous convictions, the reconviction rate for fines in each subgroup
either was lower or not significantly different than the other sanc-
tions taken as a group . As to payment of the fines, after 18 months
77% had been paid; however, over 50% defaulted in the sense of
requiring some action to force payment or were at least three weeks
late in making the payment. Somewhat surprisingly, the number of pre-
vious convictions was a better predictor of default than employment
status at the time of conviction. The other important factor in pre-
dicting default was the size of the fine. The group with the highest
default rate, 85%, was those with 3 or more previous convictions who
had been fined over t25. The group with the lowest default rate,
16%, was those over age 30 who had been fined less than fc25.
The high percentage of default notwithstanding, enforcement methods
were able to achieve a payment of 72% of the total amounts fined within
18 months. Over half of those who had not paid in full within 18 months
were reconvicted on another charge. Thirteen percent of the sample had
prison terms fixed as an alternative to payment; about five percent of
the sample were imprisoned because of default.
Although the research based upon the English experience with fines
cannot be considered definitive, it does seem safe to conclude that
fines are not significantly less effective than other sanctions for
large classes of offenders, especially first offenders. But even this
rather weak conclusion regarding relative effectiveness, provides
strong support that the use of fines has reduced the economic cost of
punishment. This is further strengthened by the fact that only a small
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fraction of those fined were ultimately incarcerated as a result of
default.
III. The German Experience
Policy History : Unlike in England, the shift in German policy towards
a major reliance upon fines in lieu of incarceration, is not primarily
attributable to rising prison costs produced by rising crime rates.
Rather in Germany this policy change is only one result of a major
reform of the penal code and penal philosophy. While it is beyond the
scope of this paper to trace this reform in detail, some background is
useful to compare the German use of fines with those of the other coun-
tries.
In 1954 a Grand Commission for Penal Reform (Grosse
(Straf rechtskommission) was formed and given a mandate to produce a
new penal code to replace the existing code which dated back to 1871.
The work of the Commission provided the basis for the official govern-
ment draft of 1962 [German Draft Penal Code E 1962]
.
Two major results of the reform were decriminalization of many
minor and moral offenses, and in sentencing, a shift in philosophy
from "retributive justice" towards "resocialization" [Lee and Robertson,
1973: 191; Herrmann, 1976: 720]. This change in philosophy was mani-
fested by a general substitution of milder penalties, in particular, a
decrease in the use of incarceration.
For the less serious offenses, those which previously would have
received prison sentences of six months or less, fines or suspended
sentences were to replace incarceration altogether. The First Law
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Refonning the Penal Code, effective September 1, 1969, provided that
prison terms of less than six months were to be replaced by fines or
probation in all but exceptional cases. This policy was to be followed,
general deterrence considerations, aside. Although short term sentences
were not abolished completely, a very significant reduction was achieved
as is shown in Table 1. In 1968 over one hundred and ten thousand
sentences to prison terms of less than six months were awarded; in
1976 this figure dropped to only about ten thousand, even though total
convictions rose. A rather remarkable achievement.
This impressive shift away from short term incarceration found
support from two quite different rationales. One viewed prisons as
"schools of crime" and thus not only incapable of effecting resociali-
zation, but even counter productive in achieving this goal. The other
view, professes faith in the possibility of resocialization under
appropriate conditions of incarceration. These conditions include
uncrowded prisons and incarceration—treatment—for an extended period
[Jescheck, 1975: 305; Artz, 1979: 47]. Part of the reform program
was the creation of special institutions devoted to providing treatment.
These institutions, however, have yet to be completed because of bud-
getary restrictions. Also, in addition to budgetary obstacles, there
now appears a growing doubt as to the efficacy of treatment [Kaiser,
1978: 419].
Although this increased use of fines is not a direct response to
rising crime and the concomitant pressure of prosecutorial and court
resources, it has nevertheless helped to relieve these pressures. To
fully appreciate the resource implications of the use of fines in
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Germany, on must be aware of two important aspects of German criminal
law procedure: the "legality principle" and "penal orders." The
legality principle requires German prosecutors to prosecute all serious
crimes and, with exceptions, most misdemeanors [Langbein and Weinreb,
1978: 1561]. Indeed, some American legal scholars familiar with the
important resource rationing role played by discretionary prosecution
—
plea bargaining—in the U.S. have characterized the adherence to the
legality principle as a myth [Goldstein and Marcus, 1977: ]. This
skepticism, however, has been effectively criticized. The plausibility
of adherence to the legality principle is greatly enhanced by the pro-
secutors use of penal orders. The penal order is a form of summary
prosecution and sentencing available to the prosecutor for less serious
offenses, roughly misdemeanors; only fines can be imposed by a penal
order. On the basis of the police investigation, and in some cases
his own, the prosecutor may determine guilt and levy a fine. Penal
orders, however, do require judicial approval. Further, if the accused
objects, the penal order is set aside and the case goes to trial, other-
wise the fine is routinely enforced [Feldsteiner, 1979: 310]. 3y using
penal orders for the less serious crimes, but those which occur in great
volume, prosecutorial resources are economized for use in prosecuting
all serious crimes.
Although the shift from short term imprisonment to the use of
fines and suspended sentences went into effect in 1969, a further
reform law, effective in 1975, introduced a day-fine system. The day-
fine is a Scandinavian innovation used extensively in Sweden. The
function of the day fine is to divide the fine sentencing decision
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into two distinct decisions. The first is an assignment of the number
of day fines according to the degree of guilt and gravity of the
offense. The second is to explicitly consider the economic status of
the offender and assign a unit value to the day fine for the par-
ticular offender. The absolute amount of the fine is the product of
the unit value and the number of day fines. The result is a fine
system which seeks to punish equally offenses of similar gravity but
at the same time, given the penalty is monetary, to achieve equity
across offenders of disparate financial means. While a great many
legal systems, in principle, recognize the equity issue in the use of
fines, most deal with it in a far less explicit manner.
Operational Aspects : The basic legal provisions of the day-fine
system are that the number day fines which may be levied for an offense
are restricted to a minimum of 5 to a maximum of 360. The permissable
range for the unit value assessment cannot be less than 2 Deutsche Marks
nor more than 10,000 Deutsche Marks. In assigning the unit value in
individual cases a concept of net income is to be used. The legal
guideline states "The day-fine is the average sum of money which may
be daily chargable to the offender taking into account his income, his
realisable assets, his actual standard of living, his maintenance
responsibilities, his normal expenditure and his family situation"
[Beristan, 1976: 260].
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The penal code permits incarceration in the event of default at the
rate of one day of incarceration for every day-fine unpaid. This pro-
vision has been criticized both because the substitution is too harsh
and because some object to use of incarceration at all [Beristan, 1976:
26j Driendl, 1976: 1152, 1154]. In fact, however, the use of incar-
ceration as an enforcement mechanism is relatively rare. It is
reported that only 2.7% to 4% of all cases involve incarceration
[Kaiser, 1978: 417; Max Planet Institute, 1978: 4].
Only one study could be found that addressed the effectiveness of
fines compared to other sanctions. Since fines are used most fre-
quently for first offenders, the study compared two groups of first
offenders, one group which received fines and the other received a pri-
son sentence. The reconviction rate was 16% for those who were fined
and 50% for those who were imprisoned [Max Planet Institute, 1978: 5].
Without further information on what other characteristics might have
distinguished the two groups, e.g., nature of offense, age, etc., these
results must be considered as providing only a tentative answer to the
question of relative effectiveness of the two sanctions. This
qualification, notwithstanding, the data provide support for the effec-
tiveness of fines as used in Germany and strongly suggest that the sen-
tencing reform has not imposed a cost in the form of higher levels of
crime.
IV. The Swedish Experience
Policy History : Of the four countries studied, Sweden is unique in
terms of the heavy historic reliance upon fines and in terms of the
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innovations adopted to facilitate the wide use of fines. The long
term extensive use of fines is illustrated by Table 2. If offenses
are defined broadly, i.e., under all statues, the percent of persons
sanctioned by fines is remarkable both for the high value and for the
stability of this percentage over a century. This broad definition of
offenses has the advantage of minimizing the impact of inevitable
changes in the scope of the formal criminal law over such a long period.
It also includes offenses which are sanctioned under special laws as
well as under the formal penal code, e.g., even though narcotics
offenses are under a special statute very heavy sanctions can still
be imposed. The observed stability in the use of fines over the cen-
tury can be viewed as a reflection of Swedish society's continuing
commitment to humanitarian forms of punishment, notwithstanding sig-
nificant changes in patterns of deviant behavior.
A somewhat different pattern emerges if one looks only at offenses
under the penal code, i.e., those offenses which comprise traditional
forms of criminality. This eliminates many types of quasi-criminal
and regulatory offenses such as motoring offenses. As a result the
percentage of offenses sanctioned by a fine, understandably, is reduced.
Nevertheless, the percentage remains very high by comparison to other
countries over a similarly long period. The declining trend in the
use of fines is attributable, in part, to the adoption of more severe
penalties for assault. In 1950 96% of those sentenced for assault were
fined; in 1978 only 47% were fined [Astrom, 1977: 3].
In Sweden the underlying principle of the penal code has been
"...that treatment is to replace punishment" [National Swedish Council
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Table 2
The Use of Fines as a Sanction in Sweden: 1871-1977
Offenses Under all Statutes Offenses Under the Penal Code
Persons Persons Percent Persons Persons Percent
Period Sentenced Fined Fined Sentenced Fined Fined
1871/75 39,562 37,188 94.0% „
1896/00 73,929 71,025 96.1% — — —
1921/25 84,620 81,774 96.6% — — —
1941 138,961 132,440 95.3% — — —
1947 152,300 144,335 94.8% — — —
1950 174,235 163,614 93.9% 19,372 10,483 54.1%
1955 269,535 254,471 94.4% 22,576 11,463 50.8%
1960 434,341 413,802 95.3% 28,849 14,450 46.6%
1965 336,824 315,314 93.6% 31,595 15,576 49.3%
1970 391,636 363,142 92.7% 40,347 18,777 46.5%
1974 489,266 460,048 94.0% 39,237 17,905 45.6%
1975 477,227 448,180 93.9% 40,232 19,284 47.9%
1976 466,518 437,511 93.7% 40,287 19,116 47.4%
1977 399,812 396,038 92.3% 42,144 19,635 46.5%
These include the Penal Code, Road Traffic Offenses, Narcotics Offenses, Smuggling
and Revenue Offenses as well as breaches of regulations.
"Excluding Drunkenness (BR 16:15) and Disorderly Conduct (BR 16:16). These two
offenses are now dealt with almost totally outside the penal code. When they were
in the penal code they accounted for around 60% of all sentences and the sentences
were almost all fines.
Source: Astrom (1977) Tables 2:1 and 2:2 and Yearbook of Legal Statistics : 1976-78,
National Central Bureau of Statistics, Stockholm 1979, Tables 3.4.4 and 3.4.14,
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for Crime Prevention, 1978: 7]. Given the resocialization objective
of the penal code there has naturally followed a strong preference for
humane treatments, in practice this has meant avoidance of incarcera-
tion whenever possible and then it was viewed as "treatment" not "punish-
ment." The loss of faith in the efficacy of treatment for offenders,
now widely accepted in the United States, is also beginning to influence
Swedish penal philosophy.
It can be said therefore that renuciation of the
treatment ideology leads to a more honest acceptance
of the fact that the basis of the criminal justice
system is the provision of penalties for punishable
acts rather than the provision of coercive treatment
for character deficiencies [Bishop, 1975: 24].
Since incarceration can no longer be viewed as only a necessary
means to deliver treatment, it must be evaluated on other grounds.
However, it is not seen as particularly efficacious from the point of
view of general deterrence. General deterrence, while viewed as one
valid function of some form of punishment, it is not accorded the
priority and importance reflected in much of the U.S. literature.
There still remains a strong adversion for incarceration both on human-
itarian grounds and because some research results indicate that it may
even be criminogenic [Bishop, 1975: 22].
One of the implications of this reappraisal of penal philosophy is
that fines have even greater appeal as a sanction than heretofore.
They retain their appeal as an alternative to incarceration on humani-
tarian grounds and further they have never been viewed as "treatment."
Thus, they are consistent with the view of sanctions as punishment
rather than treatment. An implication that has been drawn for penal
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policy is that the scope of use of fines should be enlarged [National
Swedish Council for Crime Prevention, 1978: 33]. One suggested means
of greater use of fines for more serious crimes is to combine them with
conditional sentences. In this wider use it has also emphasized that
day-fines are the appropriate form of monetary penalty rather than flat
fines.
The present law permits incarceration if the fine is not paid.
Although the number of persons incarcerated annually for default is by
all accounts small, there remains the concern that such incarceration
falls disproportionately on disadvantaged groups.
A special commission has reviewed the use of incarceration for
fine enforcement and has recommended that the legislation permitting
conversion of unpaid fines to incarceration be abolished. They recog-
nize that the present high percentage of fines paid is attributable,
in part, to the threat of incarceration. However, in their view, the
gains in terms of social justice from abolishing this threat would
more than offset the reduction in fines collected [Betankande avgivet
av Forvandlindsstraffutredningen, 1975]. The parliament is still con-
sidering the commission's recommendation, but appears to be reluctant
to abolish completely the threat of incarceration.
There is a potential conflict between the two major proposed
changes in the role of fines in Sweden. If the scope for the use of
fines is widened to include more serious offenses, the average size of
fines levied would also be expected to rise. If the average size of
fines imposed is increased, one would expect the probability of default
to increase as well. And, if, in addition, the threat of incarceration
-18-
is removed, the combined effect could cause the percent of fines de-
faulted to rise to an unacceptable level.
Operational Aspects : The use of monetary penalties in Sweden is compli-
cated in several respects. First, monetary penalties may be imposed,
if the offender consents, through a summary procedure initiated either
by policemen or by public prosecutors, or by a court sentence. The
monetary penalties imposed by policemen are called "summary fines
("breach of regulations fines") and they are for minor offenses, e.g.,
drunkenness, disorderly conduct, and traffic offenses. The amounts are
limited to 250 krona for a single offense or 400 krona for multiple
offenses. The public prosecutor is authorized to impose "summary
penalties," most of which are in fact fines [ Rattsstatistisk Arsbok ,
1978: 163]. It is quite important to be aware of these technical dis-
tinctions in analyzing Swedish statistics as to the role played by
monetary penalties.
A second complication is the variety of methods which are used to
calculate the amount of the monetary penalty. As noted earlier, the
day-fine method has long been in use in Sweden; however, use is still
made of flat or ordinary fines, i.e., fines levied by an absolute amount.
A third type of fine is "Standardized Fine;" the amount of this fine is
computed as a fixed percentage of the amount of illegal monetary gain
involved in certain categories of offenses, primarily tax evasion. These
are now used very little as they are thought to be too mechanical and do
not permit taking into account other circumstances that might be involved
in the offense.
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Monetary penalties imposed under the penal code are almost totally
day-fines if one excludes drunkenness and disorderly conduct. Fines
imposed under the special acts include both day fines and ordinary fines.
However, if one excludes offenses under the Road Traffic Act, about two
thirds of these fines are day fines and one third are ordinary fines.
Thus, it is clear that day-fines are the dominant type of monetary sanc-
tion, except for drunkenness, disorderly conduct and minor traffic
offenses.
Prosecutors may impose day-fines of up to 50 for a single offense
and up to 60 for multiple offenses. Courts, however, may impose up to
120 day-fines for a single offense or up to 180 for multiple offenses.
Unit values of a day-fine, although based upon the offender's economic
condition, may not exceed 500 kronor nor be less than 2 kronor
[Thomsted, 1975: 307]. The unit value is roughly set at 1/lOOOth of
the offenders annual income but then adjusted downwards for taxes. The
permissable range of traditional fines is from 10 to 500 kronor for a
single offense or up to 1000 kronor for multiple offenses. The 500
kronor maximum may be contrasted with the 60,000 kronor maximum under
the day-fines. Thus, the day-fines offer a penalty of potentially far
greater severity.
Although fines play a major role in penal policy, there is sur-
prisingly little published research on the relative effectiveness of
fines as a sanction. This can be attributable, perhaps, to the strong
philosophic aversion to the use of incarceration. There seems to be
such a strong a_ priori assumption that the low social costs of fines
relative to incarceration makes empirical validation unnecessary.
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However, a recent study by Astrom has addressed the question of
relative effectiveness of fines compared to short term imprisonment.
Two measures of effectiveness were used to analyze a sample of offen-
ders convicted for four traditional crimes (assault, theft, other pro-
perty offenses, and drug offenses); the effectiveness measures were
recidivism and payment of fines [Astrom, 1977]. A comparison of the
recidivism rates across the four crimes indicated a recidivism rate
for short term imprisonment to be twice the recidivism rate for court
imposed fines. While these data indicate that fines are relatively
more effective, it should be noted that there are no controls for age,
prior criminal record or severity of the offense within the general
type. Here, as with the English data, one cannot clearly differentiate
the effect of the sanctions, per se , from other factors that may have
been used by the courts in their sentencing decisions. This qualifi-
cation notwithstanding, the existing pattern of use of fines does not
appear to be imposing high costs in terms of recidivism.
The sample was also analyzed with respect to the percent of fines
which were paid. It was found that over 90% of those fined did ulti-
mately pay the fine. The percentage of persons who ultimately did not
pay, surprisingly, was slightly larger for offenders in the higher
socio-economic groups than those in the lowest socio-economic groups.
However, a much larger percentage of those in the lowest socio-economic
group required enforcement measures.
Astrom concluded that there did appear to be to exist some scope
for greater use of fines within the four offenses he studied. This
was based upon the effectiveness of fine collection and the fact that
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short term imprisonment was being used in each crime category for
offenses where the actual social damage was not great, e.g., assaults
where medical attention was not required.
Another institutional innovation, in addition to day-fines and the
summary penalty procedure, developed by Sweden relates to the fine
enforcement process. Unlike the other countries, the courts and prose-
cutors in Sweden are relieved of the administrative burden of effecting
the payment of fines they impose. Once levied, the fine collection
process is turned over to the Debt Collection Authority
(Kronofogemyndigheten) . If the individual does not voluntarily pay the
fine, the authority is given up to five years to collect the fine. The
Authority's power and methods consistently results in collection of
between 85 and 90% of all fine amounts levied [Betankande Avgivet av
Forvandlingsstraf futredningen, 1975: 88]. At the end of five years, if
their efforts have not effected payment, the matter is referred back to
the prosecutor or court for possible conversion of the unpaid amount to
a prison sentence. The court or prosecutor, however, may take no
further action or they may again refer the case back to the Authority
for further efforts.
V. United States Experience
The decentralized criminal justice structure of the United States
—
fifty one separate criminal codes and penal systems
—
precludes a
comprehensive review. Consequently, the policy review will deal not
with legislative history per se
,
but rather will review the relevant
policy statements of national commissions and national organizations
with the stature and expertise to influence policy formulation in all
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U.S. states. Similarly, the review of sentencing patterns will be
very selective, not only to keep the scope manageable, but simply
because published data on all sanctions imposed does not exist for most
of the fifty one criminal justice systems.
Policy History : Several national organizations and commissions which
seek to shape penal policy have offered recommendations as to the role
of fines; the majority of these recommendations, however, evidence a
very marked distrust of fines as a criminal sanction. Some examples
will clearly establish this distrust.
The American Law Institute's Model Penal Code project has produced
a model penal code. This code's influence is reflected in the
substantive provisions of many recently revised state penal codes.
The model code recommends fines be used only when the offense resulted
in a pecuniary gain and fines alone are not to be used unless the
court is affirmatively of the opinion that it will suffice to protect
the public interest [American Law Institute, 1962]. The exact nature
of the relevant public interest is not specified.
This distrust of the use of fines is also reflected by the
American Bar Association's project on standards for criminal justice:
"Because of its doubts as to the correlational value of the fine, the
Committee would express a presumption against its imposition in the
absence of a clear, affirmative reason" [American Bar Association,
1971]. The National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws
would similarly restrict the use of fines. The rationale is: "Because
fines do not have affirmative rehabilitative value and hurt an
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offender's dependents more than the offender himself, fines are dis-
couraged. . .unless some affirmative reason indicates that a fine is
particularly appropriate" [National Advisory Commission. .
.
Proceedings
,
1973; 296]. The National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice
Standards and Goals is somewhat less restrictive in its recommenda-
tions: "A fine should be imposed where it appears to be a deterrent
against the type of offense involved or an appropriate correctional
technique for an individual offender" [National Advisory Commission...
Corrections
, 1973].
In contrast, the Council of Judges of the National Council on
Crime and Delinquency affirmatively urges the use of fines rather than
imprisonment for all non-dangerous offenders [1972; 38]. The logical
basis here is obvious—minimize the social cost of punishment. Support
for greater use of fines is also given by the Committee on the Judi-
ciary of the U.S. Senate.
The Committee is of the view that fines have been
an inappropriately under-used penalty in American
criminal law, even though there are many instances
in which a fine in a measured amount can constitute
a highly effective means of achieving one or more
of the goals of the criminal justice system [1975;
893].
Although it is very clear that a widespread distrust of fines
exist, the logical basis is far less so. How is "correlational value"
or "rehabilitative value" defined? Would it suffice that the fine
have a deterrent value irrespective of the basis, or must the fine
also rehabilitate—effect a moral reformation in— the offender? While
the fine may hurt the offender's dependents, would the harm for them
from a fine be greater than If the offender were incarcerated?
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It has been noted that considerations of just desert can make a
fine an unjust punishment because, for the poor, it would result in
"imprisonment for poverty" [Miller, 1956]. Implicit in this argument,
however, is an assumption regarding how fines are set; in particular,
it is assumed that fines are levied in fixed absolute terms and are
independent of the financial means of the offender. This assumption
relates to a particular institutional arrangement rather than some
invariant aspect of human behavior. Further, recent Supreme Court
decisions have gone some distance in eliminating the possibility of
"imprisonment for poverty" [U.S. Supreme Court, 1971].
Another basis of the distrust is, for the affluent, fines would be
a "license for crime." This, however, assumes that fines for many
people are not punitive or that fines "debase the criminal sanction"
[Packer, 1968, 223]. Either variant is difficult to sustain on a
logical basis. First, in a society where material values are as
venerated in practice as they are in the U.S., it strains the imagina-
tion to assume that a fine could not be set at a sufficient level,
given an offender's financial means, so as to be viewed by everyone as
punitive. The "debasement" argument relates to the educative or moral
influence of the criminal law. In a market economy, most licit goods
and services have a price attached to them which is the "penalty" for
acquiring them. It could be argued that the use of fines bears such a
strong analogy to a "price" of an illicit act that the moral signaling
function of the criminal law is blocked. Whether this is so, must
depend, in large part, on whether the fine, given its level, is viewed
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as punishment. Further, the educative process is far more complicated
than this argument suggests [Andenaes, 1975].
In summary, the purely logical arguments supporting the distrust
of fines are far from compelling. They either take as given the
existing (inadequate) institutional structures, or are based upon
implicit empirical assumptions for which no supporting evidence is
presented.
Operational Aspects : It is not surprising that discussions of fines
as a criminal sanction proceed exclusively on an a priori level;
empirical studies of fines in the U.S.—either descriptive or evalua-
tive—are virtually nonexistent. Such studies that report any analy-
sis of fines deal only with offenses on the borderline of criminal
conduct, e.g., traffic offenses and disorderly conduct (drunkenness)
[Lovald, 1968], [Mechem, 1968]. A summary of the research findings in
this area from an extensive review of the correctional treatment
literature took only three sentences.
"Fines are regarded as a punishment rather than as
a treatment by metaphysicians devoted to the medical
model of treatment. Despite the immense possibili-
ties of fines for the humane administration of justice,
there was only one study. Fines were associated with
fewer expected reconvictions compared with probation
for both offenders and recidivists." [Lipton, 1975;
242]
Absent only compelling logical arguments or empirical evidence
that fines are less effective than incarceration for selected offenses,
it appears that the role of fines in U.S. penal policy badly needs to
be reexamined.
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VI. Comparative Sentencing Patterns
The purpose of our analysis is to determine the actual use of fines
relative to other sanctions for comparable crimes in the countries
studied. For these countries the primary sanctions of interest, fines
and incarceration, raise few questions of qualitative comparability.
However, the types of behavior which are criminal can differ signifi-
cantly across countries, and even for types of behavior that have been
criminalized, the classification schemes can be quite different. If
our purpose were to compare the severity of sanctions by some quanti-
tative metric these issues would have to be addressed with great care.
However, our objective is less ambitious; we do not attempt to deal
with all criminal offenses but only with "traditional crimes" and sanc-
tions are compared only in a qualitative fashion. By traditional crimes
we mean those forms of behavior which have been criminalized in each of
the countries over a long period of time. We thus exclude offenses
relating to drugs, both because similar behavior may not be crimina-
lized in all of Che countries at present and because, within each of
the countries, significant changes may have occurred in their legal
treatment in the recent past.
And even among the group of traditional crimes, also excluded were
those for which a monetary penalty alone would generally not be con-
sidered appropriate, for example, the most serious crimes against the
person or society (homicide, treason). By exclusion, we are thus left
with moderately to less serious crimes against the person, i.e., assault
(excluding aggravated assaults) and property crime which does not
involve a serious threat to the person, e.g., we exclude robbery.
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Suitable data are available for European countries using their
national sentencing data by penal code offenses. The United States
data, however, presents two major problems. First, there are fifty one
different correctional systems; thus, even if data were available, some
selection would be required. The second problem, which solves the
first, is that most state court systems do not publish sentencing data
classified by specific crime and by type of sanction imposed. Further,
such data as is published generally deals only with felony offenses.
The potential scope of fines, as an alternative to incarceration,
includes both the more serious misdemeanors as well as the less serious
felonies. Given these difficulties, we have found suitable sentencing
data only for the U.S. District Courts and for the Superior Court of
Washington, D.C.
The sentencing data for traditional crimes in each jurisdiction is
presented in Table 3. The original data by specific penal code offense
is given in the Appendix for those interested in greater detail.
Although Table 3 deals only with traditional crimes, this group accounts
for over two thirds of all criminal offenses in European countries and
over half in the U.S. District Courts. The smaller percentage accounted
for by traditional crimes in the Superior Court of Washington, D.C. is
due both to proportionately more serious crimes against the person and
also more minor crimes, e.g., victimless crimes.
The data clearly establish the heavy reliance placed upon fines by
European countries and the relatively low reliance upon incarceration.
Among the three countries, it is surprising that Sweden uses fines
relatively less than the other two. The very high use of fines in
^.ppendix is available on request from the author.
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Table 3
Selected Traditional Crimes - Comparative Sentencing Patterns
Total of Percent
Selected of All Incarcer- Fine All
Country: Defendants: Defendants: ation: Only: Other:
2
England and Wales, 293,580 69% 14% 56% 30%
1977
3
Germany, 1977 191,329 77% 10% 77% 13%
Sweden,^ 1977 29,121 67% 13% 43% 44%
United States 16,057 56% 39% 5% 56%
Federal District
Courts, 5 1977/78
Washington, D.C.^ 1,847 38% 32% 4% 64%
Superiour Court,
1974
Selection objective was to include all traditional crimes which did not
pose a serious threat to the person, e.g., assaults were included but
aggravated assaults were excluded when these could be separately identi-
fied.
Offenses from Table A.l included are: Other Wounding, Assault, Theft,
Fraud and Forgery.
3
Offenses from Table A. 2 included are: Assault, Theft and Embezzlement,
Fraud and Forgery.
4
Offenses from Table A. 3 included are: Assault, Theft (less Grand Theft
and Robbery,), Fraud and Embezzlement.
Offenses from Table A. 4 included are: Assault, Larceny and Theft,
Embezzlement, Fraud, Auto Theft, and Forgery and Counterfeiting.
Offenses from Table A. 5 included are: Assault, Larceny, Stolen Vehicle,
Forgery and Counterfeiting, Fraud, Embezzlement, and Stolen Property
Dealing.
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Germany reflects the results of their penal reform and the conscious
shift to the use of fines. In contrast, the two U.S. jurisdictions use
fines only minimally as a sentence for traditional crimes but use
incarceration two to three times as much as European countries. In the
concluding section we address the potential sources of this differential
use of fines and the lessons that the European experience offers to U.S.
policy in this area.
VII. Conclusions
The most significant finding of the comparative analysis is the
wide disparity in the use of monetary penalties for traditional crimes
between the three European countries as a group and the United States.
This, of course, raises the more fundamental question—why should penal
policies be so different among countries so similar economically,
culturally, and politically? A definitive answer to this question
would be the subject of another study; however, some tentative obser-
vations are in order.
One possible explanation is that the U.S. population differs
significantly in terms of criminological characteristics from the
European populations. Although we have compared sentencing patterns
for similar categories of specific crimes, there may remain signifi-
cant differences in the nature of crimes within apparently similar
categories. For example, within the assault category, U.S. assaults
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may more frequently involve the use of a firearm or other dangerous
weapon. Or, the population of U.S. offenders, within a given category,
may be composed of a much higher percentage of recidivists than first
offenders. If recidivists are given more severe sentences than first
offenders, this could explain the lower U.S. use of fines in any given
category. Finally, it may be that criminal activity of the U.S. popu-
lation of offenders and potential offenders is less response to the
threat of punishment than European populations. Thus, more severe
penalties are required in the U.S. than in Europe to achieve socially
acceptable levels of deterrence.
It should be emphasized that all of the above examples are merely
speculative; they are not based upon established factual differences.
Indeed, they illustrate that existing sentencing policy is to a large
extent formulated in a vacuum of empirical knowledge.
It is, of course, also possible that any objective differences in
criminological characteristics of the populations are irrelevant; the
observed differences in sentencing policies may be the result of phi-
losophical or cultural differences. For example, an experienced offi-
cial in Swedish corrections has observed that the more racially homo-
geneous character of the Swedish population supports a strong
"humanitarian" basis for Swedish correctional policy while the more
racially mixed U.S. population is conducive to a retributive basis for
U.S. policy [Marnell, 1972]. There is some support for this as an
explanation in the fact that European policy discussions exhibit an
explicit a_ priori distrust of incarceration as a penalty. This dis-
trust appears to be based more upon philosophic or humanitarian con-
siderations than upon utilitarian considerations, e.g., incarceration
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may be criminogenic. However, both considerations are expressed.'
Conversely, as we have illustrated, U.S. policy discussions exhibit a
similar a^ priori distrust of fines. This distrust also appears to be
based upon a philosophical set as much as upon utilitarian assumptions,
e.g., fines have a very low deterrent value.
A final possible explanation, and one which we would give the most
support, is based upon the observation that the central objective of
U.S. correctional policy for several decades has been to effect a
rehabilitation of offenders. While the achievability of this goal is
now seriously questioned, it remains the foundation upon which most
existing practices and institutions have been erected. Within such an
institutional structure there is little room for monetary penalties.
Fines have the potential to punish, and possibly to deter, but not to
rehabilitate . Thus, the dominance of a rehabilitative approach to
corrections has precluded a serious consideration of the use of fines.
Further, the inattention given to fines has served to indirectly
limit their use even more. Given that the statues provide for flat
fines and absolute maximums and inflation is a continuing condition of
economic life, then continuous "preventive maintenance" of the fine
provisions of the penal code by the legislatures is required. If the
statutory maximums are not periodically revised, then the real value
of the legislated maximums will fall to a point where fines cease to
be a viable sentencing option even for judges who would like to use
them. The infrequent revision of fine maxima in most U.S. states are
indicative of a failure Co carry out this preventive maintenance.
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In contrast to this philosophical and institutional neglect of
fines in the U.S., European countries have consciously designed insti-
tutional structures and adopted innovations which minimize the poten-
tial defects of monetary penalties and capitalize upon their advantages.
Two such innovations in structure appear to be particularly important
and worth careful study by U.S. policy makers. These are the day-fine
and the summary penal authority given prosecutors in Germany and
Sweden.
The day-fine system has many advantages over a system where flat
fines are the norm. The day fine forces the sentencing decision pro-
cess to deal explicitly and independently with both the seriousness of
the offense and the offender's financial means. Relating the unit
value of the day fine to the offender's financial means both deals
with the equity issue and reduces the risk of default. Day fines can
also dispell the alleged perception that fines are a "license for
crime"; that is, they can produce an absolute monetary penalty which
would be viewed as clearly punitive even for offenders with relatively
abundant financial resources. Put somewhat differently, as a form of
punishment day fines have an "expressive value" that flat fines lack
because they are so commonly used to regulate forms of behavior that
clearly are not criminal, e.g., minor traffic violations.
Finally, inflation does not erode the punitive capacity of the
day-fine structure. The statutes set limits in terms of the number of
day-fines, the courts set unit values—case by case—on the basis of
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current incomes and current incomes rise with inflation. Thus, day
fines are automatically indexed against inflation.
Another innovation used in Sweden and Germany is the summary
penalty authority of the public prosecutor. This authority is
generally applicable only to offenses punishable by fines; however,
since fines are authorized for a wide range of offenses, a large
number of offenses can be disposed of by this procedure. The summary
penalty procedure reduces the cost of adjudiciation and the use of
fines reduces the cost of punishment. An accused who is subjected to
a summary penalty may reject this disposition and receive a court
trial; thus, due process is not replaced.
The summary penalty procedure would appear to offer far less
opportunity for abuse than our informal plea bargaining procedure.
Further, since most of the large flow of moderately serious cases may
be disposed expeditiously through by summary penalties, more prosecu-
torial resources are available to deal with the most serious cases.
A final innovation adopted in Sweden, is the use of a central
government debt collection authority. The collection of fines levied
by the courts become the administrative responsibility of this central
authority. The authority has broad authority to effect the collection.
The advantage of this procedure is that the major administrative burden
of fine collection is removed from the courts.
Throughout this study the emphasis has been upon the economic
advantages of monetary penalties in the form of fines over incarcera-
tion as a penalty. From this point of view, there is no difference
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between monetary penalties in the form of fines from monetary
penalties in the form of restitution; both represent a lower economic
cost to society of punishment than incarceration. The use of incar-
ceration reduces the total economic output of society by immobilizing
the labor resources of the offender and society's resources needed to
enforce the sentence. By substituting, at the margin, monetary
penalties for incarceration more resources become available for econo-
mic production and an economic gain is realized. The difference
between fines and restitution rests in how this gain is distributed.
Fines distribute it exclusively to taxpayers, while restitution
distributes it, in part, to the offender's victim. Which of these
distributions is superior is an ethical judgment, not an economic
judgment. The economic judgment is that, other things equal, monetary
penalties, in either form, are superior to incarceration.
We concluded that the above analysis has established a strong pre-
sumption that U.S. sentencing policy fails to utilize monetary
penalties as an alternative to incarceration up to the point where the
marginal social cost of punishment for each is equal. Consequently,
the social cost of crime and crime control is higher than it need be.
Although our evidence is not claimed to be conclusive, it does point
to a serious need to both re-think the a_ priori basis of current U.S.
policy, i.e., punishment versus rehabilitation, and to initiate the
necessary research to fill the vacuum of empirical knowledge in which
this policy has been formulated.
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